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AGENCY "CAPTURE": THE "REVOLVING DOOR"
BETWEEN REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND THEIR
REGULATING AGENCIES
Edna Earle Vass Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Public confidence in the integrity of our public officials is neces-
sary for effective government.1 The independence of the federal
regulatory process is a crucial element of that confidence. When
this independence is examined, however, a major concern arises
about the inherent appearance of impropriety and conflict of inter-
est in the "revolving door" practice of federal agencies.
The term "revolving door" is popularly used to describe the in-
terchange of personnel between the government and the private
sector. There is not only a long history of concern over the free
flow of individuals passing through the revolving door to and from
the federal government, but there is also a long history of restric-
tions on that interchange of personnel.2
With respect to the federal regulatory agencies, the concern is
that the "revolving door" between the agencies and the industries
they regulate could hinder the agencies' effectiveness and indepen-
dence. Regulatory agencies might become "captured" by the ex-
change of personnel with the industries they are responsible for
regulating.3 The impartiality of the agency's exercise of its regula-
* Private practice, Arlington, Virginia; Member of the Virginia and Washington, D.C.
Bars; B.A., University of Virginia, 1970; J.D., American University, 1972.
1. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 382 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 201 app.
at 1025-27 (1976) (President Johnson prescribed ethical standards of conduct for govern-
ment officers and employees in response to his recognition that a citizen is "entitled to have
complete confidence in the integrity of his government."); see also H PUB. PAPERS 1854,
1855 (Oct. 26, 1978) (President Carter expressed similar concerns when he signed the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978.).
2. Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by Former Agency Officials in Matters
Before the Agency, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1, 5-25; Mundheim, Conflicts of Interest and the Former
Government Employee: Rethinking the Revolving Door, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 707, 711-15
(1981); see generally COMPTROLLER GEN., GEN. AcCr. OFF., WHAT RULES SHOULD APPLY TO
POST-FEDERAL EmLOYMENT AND How SHOULD THEY BE ENFORCED?, REP. B-103987 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as GAO STUDY].
3. See, e.g., J. GOULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERs: THE SMALL AND POWERFUL WORLD OF THE
GREAT WASHINGTON LAW FIRMs (1972); M. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT. THE UNSEEN
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tory independence could be compromised when its significant
policymakers come from the regulated industry.4 When an indus-
try employs former government officials of its regulating agency,
the industry might anticipate special treatment from the agency,
access to the agency, or influence in the agency.5 There has been
much debate over the issues raised by the revolving door practice,
particularly as it relates to the legal profession.'
Due to the scarcity of available empirical or concrete data, it is
difficult to assess the actual significance of the revolving door phe-
nomenon. While this elusive area has not been studied in depth
since the Government Accounting Office study of 1978,8 specific as-
pects of the subject are occasionally brought to public attention by
the media.' First amendment protections, the difficulty in monitor-
ing the activities of citizens, and the numbers of individuals in-
volved in the revolving door practice make the compilation of spe-
cific and conclusive data nearly impossible. Accordingly, public
perceptions of the phenomenon and its corresponding effect on
public confidence in the government is critical and cyclical.'0
The post-Watergate and Vietnam era provided a climate for cyn-
ical skepticism concerning the revolving door phenomenon which
was reflected in a speech to Congress by President Carter urging
POWER OF WASHINGTON LAWYERS (1978); A. KNEIER, SERVING TWO MASTERS: A COMMON
CAUSE STUDY OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (1976) [hereinafter cited
as COMMON CAUSE STUDY].
4. COMMON CAUSE STUDY, supra note 3, at ii.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Allen, The "Revolving Door"-Should It Be Stopped?, 32 AD. L. REv. 383
(1980) (ABA National Conference on Federal Regulation Panel Discussion).
7. E.g., Lacovara, Restricting the Private Practice of Former Government Lawyers, 20
ARIZ. L. REV. 369 (1978). See generally Morgan, supra note 2, at 29-35; Mundheim, supra
note 2, at 715-20.
8. GAO STUDY, supra note 2.
Common Cause is currently engaged in a related study [hereinafter cited as New Study]
which is expected to be completed by July of 1984. The purpose of the study is to evaluate
the adequacy and effectiveness of existing agency ethics programs. Particular attention will
be focused on the method utilized by designated agency officials to inform employees of the
existing ethical restrictions on current and future activities as well as the employees' respon-
sibilities to identify and report potential violations.
9. See G. ADAMS, THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING: THE IRON TRIANGLE (1982)
(description of a mutually beneficial triangle which exists between Congress, the Pentagon
and defense contractors and to which the "revolving door" contributes); see also The New
Revolving Door, 108 FORTUNE, Oct. 17, 1983, at 58 (discussion of the impact of "deregula-
tion" on the "revolving door" phenomenon, concluding that deregulation has resulted in a
new "revolving door" for deregulators).
10. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 2, at 5-25; Mundheim, supra note 2, at 711-15.
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the enactment of ethics in government legislation.11 President
Carter expressed his concern that "[a]l too often officials have
come into government for a short time and then left to accept a job
in private industry, where one of their primary responsibilities is to
handle contracts with their former employer.' 1 2 The President did
not wish to "place unfair restrictions on the jobs former govern-
ment officials may choose," but he was concerned about preventing
misuse of the influence acquired through public service.' 3 Thereaf-
ter, Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act of 197811
(Ethics Act) in order to provide statutory restraints on the practice
and to enhance public confidence in the system.15
This article will identify some of the benefits and dangers of the
revolving door phenomenon and then concentrate on an analysis of
the agency "capture" issue. Due to the lack of empirical data
needed to address the agency capture issue directly, a review of
existing statutory and other restrictions on revolving door partici-
pants and potential conflicts of interest will provide a framework
for the analysis. The significance of the potential for abuse under
the existing restrictions can be balanced against the value gained
from the revolving door practice. In all candor, any conclusions
drawn concerning the capture of regulatory agencies will necessa-
rily be subjective due to the elusiveness of the subject matter.
H. BENEFITS AND DANGERS OF THE "REVOLVING DOOR"
PHENOMENON
Consideration should be given to both sides of the revolving door
issue in order to appreciate the value of the process as well as its
potential for abuse. The need for relevant restrictions is obvious,
but the difficulty in drafting restrictions to satisfy all concerns
must also be recognized.
The revolving door between regulatory agencies and their regu-
lated industries poses potential dangers and gives rise to questions
which need to be focused upon. For example:
11. I PuB. PAPERS 786 (May 3, 1977).
12. Id. at 787.
13. Id.
14. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978). The Ethics in Government Act was origi-
nally codified in Titles 2, 5, 18, 28, and 39 of the United States Code and was amended in
1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983.
15. 11 PUB. PAPERS 1854 (Oct. 26, 1978) (President Carter's remarks when signing the
Ethics Act into law).
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1. Can the regulatory agency be unduly influenced by for-
mer government officials or employees in the performance of
its regulatory functions? Do former agency employees seek
and receive special favors from their former friends and col-
leagues in the agency that are not available to others?
2. Will former government employees utilize information
they obtained while in government service to the benefit of
their private employer and to the detriment of the public?
What about confidential information?
3. What of the potential for disloyalty if the "revolving
door" is perceived as an opportunity for future gratification?
Has government service become a training ground for insin-
cere and self-serving government employees? Are current
agency employees disloyal to their public trust if, in anticipa-
tion of personal gain, they cultivate potential private employ-
ment opportunities?
4. Will former industry employees who have entered agency
employment through political appointment, or otherwise, un-
duly influence the activities of the regulatory agency for the
benefit of their former private employer? Do their former col-
leagues seek and receive special treatment or favors unavaila-
ble to others?
Despite the dangers, there are many benefits which accrue to the
regulatory agencies and to the public resulting from the revolving
door practice."6 For example:
1. It is significant to our political system that each new Ad-
ministration appoints top level officials in accordance with its
philosophy. In order to recruit high quality individuals for
government service, temporary or otherwise, there must not
be undue restrictions on their movement back into the private
sector.
2. New blood is infused into the agencies when former in-
dustry personnel enter government service. Former industry
employees bring new perspectives, ideas, and knowledge to
the agency allowing the regulatory process to be more respon-
16. H.R. REP. No. 115, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 328, 329-33 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
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sive to the real world of industry.
3. The efficiency and quality of the relationship between in-
dustry and its regulatory agency can be enhanced when for-
mer agency employees are employed by or represent private
organizations or corporations. Former agency employees can
serve to educate and inform their private employers and the
public as to the workings of the agency. As private citizens
they can communicate with the agency with knowledge and
understanding of the system. Additionally, informed criticism
of the system by former employees could provide a public
service.
4. Agencies serve as training grounds for attorneys and
other professionals in specialty areas such as securities, tax,
and communications. Understanding the agency procedures,
policies, and regulations provides a climate for more effective
communication between an industry and its regulatory
agency. In order to competently represent a client before an
agency, a professional must be knowledgeable in his or her
specialty area.
If the revolving door between the regulated industry and its reg-
ulating agency is significantly inhibited, an elite core of govern-
ment servants, isolated and unresponsive to the legitimate con-
cerns of industry, could result. Inhibiting free movement could
undermine government recruitment and run counter to our con-
cept of a free society. A well-reasoned and cautious approach to
regulating the flow of individuals through the revolving door is
necessary since overreacting to actual or potential abuses could
hamper the regulatory process. In the shadow of Watergate, and in
light of the current suspicion of big government, the possibility of
overreaction exists.
III. THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was enacted by Congress
in order to "preserve and promote the integrity of public officials
and institutions"'1 and to restore public confidence in the govern-
17. CONFERENCE REPORT, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACr OF 1978, S. Doc. No. 127, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
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ment.18 The statute established the Office of Government Ethics
within the Office of Personnel Management,19 required certain
financial disclosure and reporting responsibilities for certain speci-
fied public officials and employees,2 0 and amended the existing law
concerning post-employment conflict restrictions (Section 207).21
Section 207 provides administrative22 and criminal2 penalties
for certain prohibited appearances before or communications with
an agency by a former agency official or employee with respect to
specific matters.24 The administrative penalties, such as a prohibi-
tion against communications with or appearances before the
agency for a period of up to five years,25 are utilized to enforce the
statute by the agencies with the primary responsibility of enforcing
the statute.26 Interpretations and applications of the statute are
found in the implementing regulations27 and interpretations, or
opinions are furnished by the Office of Government Ethics.2 Few
cases reach the courtroom,29 and there appears to be a reluctance
to enforce the criminal sanctions imposed by the statute.30
Because it was the product of compromise, the statute as en-
acted was not as stringent as the concept that Common Cause s
and other groups advocated. 2 Moreover, within months Congress
amended Section 207, further relaxing and clarifying its restric-
18. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-34 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4216 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
19. Pub. L. No. 95-521 §§ 401-405, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 401-
405 (1982)).
20. Pub. L. No. 95-521 §§ 201-211, 92 Stat. 1836-50 (1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §
201-211 (1982)).
21. Pub. L. No. 95-521 § 501(a), 92 Stat. 1864 (1978) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982)).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 207(j) (1982); see also 5 C.F.R. § 737.27(a)(9)(i)-(ii) (1983).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1982) (maximum penalty: $10,000 fine, 2 years imprisonment, or
both).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)-(c) (1982). The prohibitions vary in substance and length depend-
ing upon the former employees' involvement with the particular matter in the past and
present and his or her prior grade level.
25. Id. § 207(0); see 5 C.F.R. § 737.27(a)(9)(i) (1983).
26. 5 C.F.R. § 737.1(c)(6) (1983).
27. 18 C.F.R. § 737 (1983).
28. 5 U.S.C. app. § 402(b)(8) (1982); 18 C.F.R. § 737.1(c)(8) (1983).
29. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
30. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 4250.
31. COMMON CAUSE STUDY, supra note 3, at 67-74.
32. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 2, at 18-21.
Signing the Ethics Act into law, President Carter explained that "[t]here was a great deal
of pressure from many sources to weaken the provisions of this ethics legislation." 11 PUB.
PAPERS 1854, 1855 (Oct. 26, 1978).
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tions.3 3 To date, the post-employment restrictions placed on a for-
mer government official or employee in subsections (a) and (b) of
Section 207 prohibit only very limited and specific activities. Sec-
tion 207 does not bar a former government official from employ-
ment with any private or public employer. Further, with some ex-
ceptions, Section 207 does not effectively bar the public official
from employment on a particular matter with which he or she was
involved while employed by the government.3 4
A. Prohibited Activities
The basic lifetime prohibition of subsection (a) of Section 207
bars the former government employee from "knowingly" acting as
an agent, attorney, or representative of a person in a formal or in-
formal "appearance" 5 before his or her former agency and certain
other agencies. Section 207 further bars former government em-
ployees from representing a person by making oral or written com-
munications on behalf of that person with an "intent to influ-
ence '36 his or her agency and certain other agencies. In order for
subsection (a) to apply, the subject must concern a "particular
matter" 37 involving "specific parties" in which the former em-
ployee "participated personally and substantially" 8 while em-
ployed by the agency. Moreover, only appearances and communi-
cations with the former agency are prohibited by subsection (a).
33. House REPORT, supra note 16.
34. 5 C.F.R. § 737.1(c)(5) (1983).
35. See id. § 737.5(b)(3) (an appearance requires physical presence).
36. See id. § 737.5(a). The regulations require a potential controversy as a necessary ele-
ment to establish an intent to influence. Routine communications are not prohibited. Id. §
737.5(b)(5).
37. Id. § 737.3(a)(7). "Particular matter" includes specific proceedings, contracts, claims,
applications, charges, etc., involving specific parties in which the United States has a direct
and substantial interest. Rulemaking is not included. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (1982).
In 1980, the Office of Government Ethics advised a former government attorney that he
may represent before his former agency a private contractor whose specific contracts the
attorney had been personally and substantially involved with during his government service
when those contracts are renewed changing compensation or services. Thus, the renewed
contract would constitute a new "particular matter" for purposes of subsection (a) of Sec-
tion 207. OFFICE OF GovERNMENT ETmcs, 1979-82 DIGEST OF SELECTED OGE LErERS 3, case
no. 80x1 (Feb. 4 & Oct. 21, 1980) [hereinafter cited as OPINIONS].
38. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1982). The statute requires that "personal and substantial partici-
pation" be exercised "through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the render-
ing of advice, investigation or otherwise." Id. § 207(a)(3). According to the regulations, "sub-
stantially" means that the employees' involvement must be significant to the matter.
Emphasis is placed on the importance of the effort and more than involvement in a periph-
eral issue is required. 5 C.F.R. § 737.5(d)(1) (1983).
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In-house assistance is not prohibited even though all of the other
conditions of the subsection are met. 9 For example, the regula-
tions provide that an individual who administers a research con-
tract for a regulatory agency with X company can leave govern-
ment service to work for X company. Thereafter, he or she can
advise X company about whom to see, what to say, how to increase
the scope of fundings, or how to resolve a contract dispute with
respect to the same research contract he or she was responsible for
administering while in government service.4 °
Subsection (b)(i) of Section 207 bars acts by all former agency
employees for two years after their government employment ceases
in connection with matters that were pending under their "official
responsibility" 41 within one year prior to termination of that
responsibility.
Subsection (b)(ii) of Section 207 bars only former high-ranking
officials, designated in subsection (d),42 from "aiding and assisting"
in the representation of another person by "personal presence" 43
before his or her former agency and certain other governmental
entities. The prohibited appearance applies to matters which he or
she substantially participated in while employed by the agency.
Subsection (b)(ii) was amended in 1979 in order to make it clear
that the "aiding and assisting" restrictions on former high-ranking
officials applied only to representation by personal physical pres-
ence. The subsection amendment also made it clear that the prohi-
bition applied only to matters the former official was personally
and substantially involved with, not to matters merely under his
official responsibility.44
At the time the amendment was enacted some concern was ex-
pressed over the narrowing of the focus of subsection (b) (ii).45
39. 5 C.F.R. § 737.5(b)(6) (1983).
40. Id., example 1.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1982). The term "official responsibility" is defined as "the direct
administrative or operating authority whether intermediate or final, and either exercisable
alone or with others, and either personally or through subordinates, to approve, disapprove,
or otherwise direct Government action." Id.
42. Id. § 207(d) (1982); 5 C.F.R. § 737.25(a) (1983). These invididuals include: those paid
at least the same as those in the Federal Executive Salary Schedule, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5317
(1982); those paid at least the same as a GS-17, 5 id. § 5532; active duty commissioned
officers paid at least the same as level 0-9, 37 id. § 201; and those with "substantial decision-
making authority" as designated by the Director of the Office of Government Ethics.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 207(b)(ii) (1982).
44. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 333.
45. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
[Vol. 18:95
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Many felt that personal presence before the agency or governmen-
tal entity was less objectionable than behind the scenes assistance
and use of information on matters the former official had been per-
sonally involved with while in government service.46 It was further
argued that the prohibition on "aiding and assisting" in represen-
tation on matters that the former official was substantially in-
volved with should extend to all former government employees as
do subsections (a) and (b)(i), not just to high-ranking employees. 47
The 1979 amendment made it clear that, unlike subsection (a) of
Section 207, the personal appearance required in subsection (b)(ii)
does not include telephone calls or written correspondence with
the agency concerning the matter48 even if the intent of the com-
munication is to influence the agency in a matter" on which the
former senior official had switched sides. As long as he is not per-
sonally present before the agency, the former official can assist in
drafting documents to be presented to the agency regarding the
same matter he or she handled while a public servant.50
Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 207 focus on restricting activi-
ties in particular matters which involve specific parties. Thus the
prohibitions of these subsections do not cover the former rulemak-
ing activities of former government employees. In regulated indus-
tries the exercise of the rulemaking authority of regulatory agen-
cies is of paramount importance. Furthermore, the regulations
which govern the industry might be of greater importance to the
private employer than the outcome of a particular contract or
case.5 1 Yet the formner government employee can switch sides and
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IpACT OF THE ETHICS iN GOVERNMENT ACT
6-9 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT REPORT]. This report preceded the
adoption of the 1979 amendments to Section 207 by approximately six weeks.
46. Id. at 8. The report argues:
This modification opens an extremely large loophole, especially given that subsec-
tion (b)(ii) is to be made applicable only to matters in which the former employee
was personally involved. If anything, assistance by personal presence at an appear-
ance is less objectionable than "back room" counsel precisely because it occurs in
public. It makes no sense to prohibit former employees from "switching sides" by
personally representing private clients or counseling them at hearings, but to allow
confidences gleaned from government service to be disclosed as long as the communi-
cation occurs behind closed doors.
Id.
47. Id. at 9.
48. HousE REPORT, supra note 16, at 333.
49. 5 C.F.R. § 737.9(b) (1983).
50. Id.
51. IPACT REPORT, supra note 45, at 10.
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appear before his former agency, if he is not constrained by subsec-
tion (c), 5 2 and, with all of the knowledge and information gleaned
from his government service regarding that particular matter, in-
fluence the outcome of the rulemaking procedure.
Subsection (c) of Section 207 contains the most controversial of
the Section 207 restrictions placed on former high-ranking officials.
Those individuals, identified in subsection (d),53 are prohibited
from representing another person before their former agency in a
formal or informal appearance and from making oral or written
communications intended to influence the agency for one year af-
ter leaving government service. The restriction covers all "particu-
lar matters" 54 pending before the agency whether or not the former
employee had any involvement in them or whether they began af-
ter his or her employment terminated. 5 However, the prohibition
only bans direct agency contacts. Indirect communications or non-
representational assistance are not banned. 6
Subsection (g) of Section 207 prohibits a partner of current gov-
ernment employees from acting as an agent or attorney before the
employing agency under specific circumstances. The restriction
only extends to partners of present government employees, not for-
mer ones.5 7 No statute imputes a disqualification of a former gov-
ernment employee to his new partners.,
In 1981, the Office of Government Ethics issued an opinion in-
52. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 42.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(2) (1983). "Particular matters" are defined to include "any judicial,
rulemaking, or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination,
contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest ... ." Id. Matters not
considered "particular matter" include "broad technical areas and policy issues and concep-
tual work done before a program has become particularized into one or more specific
projects. The particular matter must be pending before the agency or be one in which the
agency has a direct and substantial interest." 5 C.F.R. § 737.11(d) (1983). See also OPINIONS,
supra note 37, at 7, case no. 81xI (Jan. 9, 1981) (advising that legislation is a "particular
matter" and therefore a former senior official should be prohibited from lobbying her former
agency on the matter for one year).
55. 5 C.F.R. § 737.11(c) (1983).
56. IMPAcT REPORT, supra note 45, at 9-10. The report proposes that new associates of the
former high-ranking official could use his name and reputation to accomplish indirectly that
which he could not do directly.
57. See OPINIoNs, supra note 37, at 1, case no. 79x03 (Aug. 3, 1979). A former government
attorney's law firm was not required by subsection (g) of Section 207 to resign from repre-
sentation in a matter the employee had participated in while in government service. The
attorney was advised to consult his professional ethics restrictions on the matter. Id.
58. Id.
104 [Vol. 18:95
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terpreting subsection (g). 59 In that opinion, the Office advised gen-
eral partners of an agency commissioner, who was their sole lim-
ited partner, that they were prohibited by subsection (g) from
representing clients before the commissioner's agency at any level
since all agency activities are under the "official responsibility" of
the agency's commissioners.6 0
The aim of Section 207 is to protect the regulatory agency deci-
sion-makers from the potential undue influence of their former col-
leagues.6 1 Concerns regarding the misuse of confidential or inside
information obtained while in government service,6 2 divided loyal-
ties, or the appearance of impropriety appear to be peripheral.
Several commentators have argued that the fiduciary duty of for-
mer government employees to preserve the confidentiality of privi-
leged, non-public or confidential information should be enforced as
a supplement to Section 207.63
B. Disclosure Requirements
Title IV of the Ethics in Government Act requires disclosure by
specified high-ranking government officials of certain personal
financial information in a detailed report filed annually with speci-
fied ethics officials.6 4 Potential conflicts of interest resulting from
financial holdings in a specific company or industry would be avail-
able for public scrutiny. Willfull or knowing failure to file the re-
59. Id. at 16, case no. 81x34 (Nov. 23, 1981).
60. Id.
61. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 4247-50.
62. Id. The potential misuse of inside governmental information was a concern of Con-
gress when it enacted the Ethics Act.
63. E.g., Kalo, Deterring Misuse of Confidential Government Information: A Proposed
Citizens' Action, 72 MICH. L. Rav. 1577 (1974) (supporting citizen suits on behalf of the
government to recover profits obtained by present and former government employees
through the utilization of confidential government information); see also Note, The Fiduci-
ary Duty of Former Government Employees, 90 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1980). The Note en-
courages the enforcement of the fiduciary responsibilities of former government employees
to protect confidential information. The advantages of such an approach were presented:
[L]egal actions to enforce a fiduciary duty could reach all instances of use of confi-
dential or inaccessible information by former officials. In addition, suit could be
brought either by government or by certain private parties, and could seek relief
through an injunction, through recovery of a delinquent fiduciary's profits, or through
damages if appropriate. Because enforcement of a general fiduciary duty would be
more comprehensive and more effective than Title V's [Section 207] system of rule
and sanctions, it would better serve the public interest in governmental efficiency,
fairness, and integrity.
Id.
64. 5 U.S.C. app. § 201 (1982); 5 C.F.R. § 734 (1983).
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port could result in administrative or civil remedies. 6 5 Knowingly
and willfully falsifying the required information could subject the
official to a felony prosecution."'
C. The Office of Government Ethics
The Office of Government Ethics was established in order to
provide universal ethics leadership and direction for the executive
branch and to provide assistance to agency heads who have the
primary repsonsibility for their agency's ethics program. 7 Each
agency has a designated agency ethics official" who is responsible
for the administration of the ethics program in that agency.6
The effectiveness of the agency ethics programs and the restric-
tions and requirements under the Ethics Act are difficult to quan-
tify. The applicable regulations have narrowed the already focused
statutory scope of the Ethics Act to the point that very few cases
have reached the courtroom. 70 The regulations require only "sub-
stantial allegations" of violations to be referred to the Department
of Justice7 1 which may prosecute aggravated cases.7
2
The key to the success of the Ethics Act as a deterrent appears
to be in the hands of each agency's designated ethics official. Thus
the adequacy and effectiveness of an agency's ethics program is
critical.75 How capable are the ethics officials of monitoring the ac-
tivities of former agency employees or current employees' involve-
ment with former employers? How well are current employees be-
ing educated so that they can identify and report potential
violations?7 4 Is the scarcity of convictions under the Act a testa-
65. 5 C.F.R. § 734.701 (1983).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
67. 5 C.F.R. § 738.102(a) (1983).
68. Id. § 738.201.
69. Id. § 738.203.
70. The cases that do reach the courts have primarily involved government prosecutors
rather than regulatory bureaucrats. See, e.g., United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 402
(N.D. IlM. 1982) (former United States attorney was disqualified under § 207(b) from repre-
senting an individual who was subsequently indicted as the result of an investigation which
occurred during his term of office); In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(former government attorney and his law firm were disqualified from representing a private
party in litigation against the government in a matter in which he previously represented
the government).
71. 5 C.F.R. § 737.1(c)(6) (1983).
72. Id.
73. See generally New Study, supra note 8.
74. There is no statute which directly requires that an agency employee report such statu-
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ment to the success of the programs? These questions are difficult,
the answers elusive, and the effectiveness of the Ethics Act in
meeting its stated goal of "preserv[ing] and promot[ing] the integ-
rity of public officials and institutions"7 5 is uncertain.
Whether or not restrictions imposed by the Ethics Act signifi-
cantly deter recruitment of potential candidates for high govern-
ment positions who might otherwise be willing to enter the "re-
volving door" is debatable. 7 There are no studies on point. The
only available statistics support the contention that ethics obliga-
tions or restrictions are not a primary reason for high-ranking
presidential appointees leaving government service.77
IV. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS RESTRICTIONS ON LAWYERS
Professional responsibilities provide additional considerations
for attorneys, who comprise a substantial portion of the "revolving
door" participants. Government attorneys who have previously
represented industrial clients, as well as attorneys who leave regu-
latory agencies to represent industrial clients, have potential pro-
fessional conflicts of interest restrictions to consider when dealing
with their former employers or clients. These attorneys are usually
in a position of influence in their representational capacity on ei-
ther side. Many commentators have explored this area;78 therefore,
this article will explore concerns raised by a recent development of
tory or regulatory violations to his or her designated ethics official, although 28 U.S.C. §
535(b) (1982) provides for the processing of such a report.
75. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1824 (1978).
76. James, Lifting Barriers to Government Service, Bus. WL, Apr. 19, 1982, at 19. The
Assistant to President Reagan for Presidential Personnel contended that "disappointing
numbers of outstanding candidates for high government positions declined to serve." Id.
Although no statistics were provided, he apparently believes the provisions of the Ethics Act
are responsible for the candidates' decisions not to serve and calls for a modification of the
statute. Id.
77. Letter from David H. Martin, Director, Office of Government Ethics, to Edna John-
son (Dec. 13, 1983). Mr. Martin included the results of several studies involving the impact
of the Ethics Act on presidential appointees' attitudes or decisions to leave government
service. Although the results of the studies were "inconclusive" generally, according to Mr.
Martin "[t]he trends indicate that the ethics requirements over time were judged to be not
as harsh or stringent as initially perceived." Id. enclosure A. The studies cited were con-
ducted by the Office of Personnel Management, Kansas State University and the Office of
Government Ethics. See generally FAA Chief Quits As Stories Spur Ethics Inquiry, Wash.
Post, Dec. 24, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
78. See generally Lacovara, supra note 7; Morgan, supra note 2; Note, Ethical Problems
for the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual Disqualification,
1977 DuKE L.J. 512; Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney,
65 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1977).
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particular interest to attorneys involved in this process: the Ameri-
can Bar Association's adoption of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules). 9
On August 2, 1983, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association adopted the Model Rules which supersede the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility"0 (CPR) as the recommended
guidelines for ethical, professional conduct. The Model Rules differ
significantly in form and substance from the CPR. Although state
bars and state supreme courts are considering the adoption of the
Model Rules, in whole or in part, to date no states have adopted
them. Until those state by state decisions are made, the impact of
the new rules is conjectural. Interesting questions are raised,
however.
The CPR format, which contains canons, ethical considerations,
and disciplinary rules as interrelated parts, was restructured in the
Model Rules where the format provides black letter authoritative
rules. Comments intended to serve as interpretive guidelines8l sup-
plement the new rules rather than the ethical goals and aspirations
provided by the CPR. 2 Ethical opinions and case law were incor-
porated into the Model Rules in an effort to simplify and clarify
the CPR 83 This commentator does not support the format
change,84 and this position is shared by others who have expressed
79. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter cited MODEL RULES].
80. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
CODE].
81. MODEL RULES, supra note 79, preamble.
82. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Proposed Final Draft]. Robert J. Kutak, Chairman of the American Bar Association
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (Kutak Commission) which was re-
sponsible for the Model Rules, explained the reasons for the format change in his introduc-
tion to the Proposed Final Draft. The general maxims, such as the avoidance of the "ap-
pearance of impropriety," MODEL CODE, supra note 80, Canon 9, and the ethical aspirations,
such as a lawyer's "temperate and dignified" conduct, id. EC 1-5, have been used by the
courts for disciplinary purposes. The Kutak Commission contended that such standards
were unacceptably vague and removed them from the new proposed rules of professional
conduct.
83. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 82, chairman's introductory note.
84. The complete removal of ethical goals and aspirations, such as avoiding the "appear-
ance of impropriety," from the ethical reponsibilities of the profession will neither enhance
the public image or confidence in the profession nor provide sufficient ethical guidance to
attorneys. Public confidence in the law, lawyers, and the legal system should be promoted
by the profession. United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 402, 410 (N.D. MII. 1982). Addi-
tionally, ethical precepts cannot be reduced to self-limiting black letter rules without the
loss of substance. Ethics is a complicated, multi-faceted subject which is over-simplified by
a comprehensive list of rules.
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significant criticism and concerns. 5
The Model Rules include a new rule entitled Successive Govern-
ment and Private Employment s' which addresses the government
attorney's professional and ethical responsibilities directly.
Thereby the emphasis of the Model Rules was shifted to the "for-
mer" government attorney rather than the lawyer "in" government
who is the focus of the CPR's disciplinary rule entitled Action of a
Public Official.8 7 Without explanation certain significant CPR dis-
ciplinary rules which relate to the lawyer "in" government were
not included in the Model Rules."" The self-limiting nature of
black letter rules absent general ethical precepts and considera-
tions presumably excludes those disciplinary rules. Are the actions
prohibited by those disciplinary rules now considered ethical in all
cases?
Model Rule 1.7 prohibiting the representation of adverse inter-
ests and Model Rule 1.9 providing specific protections which are
available to former clients are both intended to include lawyers in
the government. 9 Yet the "directly adverse" requirement of Model
Rule 1.7 and the "materially adverse" language of Model Rule 1.9
do not address the public concern addressed by the CPR in DR 8-
101(A)(1). This disciplinary rule prohibited a government attorney
from utilizing his government position for a "special advantage" to
benefit his client (or arguably his former client) contrary to the
public interest. That concern is recognized in the Comment to
Rule 1.11, but it is not addressed.90 This void is of particular con-
85. See, e.g., T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 281 (Selected
Standards Supplement 1983). A revised draft, dated May, 1982, of The American Lawyer's
Code of Conduct was offered as a proposed revision to the CPR. Co-Chairman Theodore
Koskoff indicated in the preface that the debate over the Model Rules was
not just a squabble over form. It was a serious disagreement over substance .... We
regard the proposed Kutak Rules as fundamentally flawed, and we intend to force
Kutak & Co. to debate the issues before the state courts and bar bodies that will
really decide what the law of lawyers' ethics is to be.
Id. (quoting Tan Amc.AN LAWYERs CODE OF CoNDucT preface (Revised Draft 1982)).
86. MODEL RULEs, supra note 79, Rule 1.11.
87. See MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 8-101.
88. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 8-101(A)(1) ("A lawyer who holds public
office shall not:.., use his public position to obtain ... a special advantage in legislative
matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious that
such action is not in the public interest."); id. DR 7-105(A) ("A lawyer shall not present,
participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advan-
tage in a civil matter.").
89. MODEL RULEs, supra note 79, Rule 1.11 comment.
90. Id. ("A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might
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cern when addressing the potential "capture" of a regulatory
agency by former industry attorneys. Absent mandatory restric-
tions, the Model Rules have effectively sidestepped that public
concern.
Many additional questions are raised by the self-limiting black
letter rule approach to legal ethics. For instance, Rule 1.11(a) pro-
vides that an attorney shall "not represent" a private client, absent
the appropriate agency's consent, regarding a matter in which he
personally and substantially participated while a public employee.
This language appears to track Section 207 which also prohibits
"representation," but which distinguishes it from "aiding and as-
sisting" in representation behind the scenes.91 The admonishment
in DR 9-101(B) is against the acceptance of "private employment"
in a matter in which the attorney, as a former public employee,
had substantial responsibility. No explanation is given for the
change of the acceptance of "private employment" in the discipli-
nary rule to the more narrow prohibition against "representation"
in the model rule. Under the Model Rules would a former govern-
ment attorney from a regulatory agency without agency consent be
able to "consult" with or "aid and assist" an attorney who is for-
mally representing a private client in the restricted matter as pro-
vided for in Section 207?
Model Rule 1.11(b) addresses the situation that exists when a
former government attorney has knowledge of narrowly defined
confidential government information92 concerning a person (no ref-
erence to an organization) obtained while in government service.
According to the rule, he or she "may" not represent a private cli-
ent or entity if the confidential government information could be
utilized to the material disadvantage or adverse interest of that
person. The term "may" in the Model Rules is relevant since that
term is permissive and makes the conduct discretionary, not im-
perative, and not subject to disciplinary action. 3 The voluntary
affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority.").
This comment serves as a guideline only, whereas DR 8-101(A)(1) of the Model Code is
mandatory.
91. See supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
92. MODEL RULES, supra note 79, Rule 1.11(e). The term "confidential government infor-
mation" is defined as "information which has been obtained under government authority
and which, at the time this Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from dis-
closing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise
available to the public." Id.
93. Id., Scope. The explanation is given that "[s]ome of the Rules are imperatives, cast in
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and unenforceable nature of this rule provides substantial latitude
to the former government attorney who has knowledge of highly
confidential government secrets. Abuses of even the most confiden-
tial government inside information by the regulatory agency's for-
mer attorney is not effectively prohibited by the proposed ethical
standards of the profession advocated by the American Bar
Association.
Rule 1.11(a) provides that if an agency waives a lawyer's disqual-
ification, as a former government employee, from representation in
a matter in which he personally and substantially participated, he
may represent a private client in that matter. Yet such a personal
representation could be a criminal act, if specific parties are in-
volved, under subsection (a) of Section 207 which does not provide
for a waiver.
The controversial imputed disqualification of the law firm of a
former government employee94 in matters in which he or she has
been disqualified is addressed in subsections (a) and (b) of Model
Rule 1.11. Law firms which specialize in agency practices (such as
securities, communications, transportation, etc.) frequently recruit
agency attorneys with specialized industry knowledge, experience,
and contacts. The areas in which disqualification occurs are nar-
rowly defined; therefore, former agency lawyers are valuable in the
private sector. Should a disqualification occur, Model Rule 1.11 (a)
and (b) provides for the "screening" of the disqualified former gov-
ernment employee from any participation in the matter or sharing
in the fee derived therefrom and subsection (a)(2) provides for
written notification of the screening to the affected agency.
Under the CPR, DR 9-101(B) prohibits a lawyer from "accepting
employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility
while he was a public employee." Additionally, DR 5-105(D) re-
quires that lawyers who are affiliated with a disqualified lawyer be
vicariously disqualified as well. On November 2, 1975, American
Bar Association Formal Opinion 34295 was issued which provided
the terms 'shall' or 'shall not'. These define proper conduct for purpose of professional disci-
pline. Others, generally cast in the term 'may' are permissive and define areas under the
Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion." Id.
94. Disqualification restrictions are founded upon employment as a government "em-
ployee" rather than employment as a government "attorney". 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982);
MODEL RuLEs, supra note 79, Rule 1.11; MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 9-101(B).
95. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975), re-
printed in 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976).
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for a waiver, under certain conditions, of the firm's disqualification
by the affected government agency. According to Formal Opinion
342
whenever the government agency is satisfied that the screening mea-
sures will effectively isolate the individual lawyer from participating
in the particular matter and sharing in the fees attributable to it,
and there is no appearance of significant impropriety affecting the
interest of the government, the government may waive the disquali-
fication of the firm under DR 5-105(D). 6
The restrictions placed on "screened" lawyers are popularly re-
ferred to as a "Chinese wall" and have been the subject of consid-
erable attention. 7 The agency's discretion in granting the waiver
has been a subject of controversy9 as has the appropriateness of
the screening technique advanced by Opinion 342.9e
However, under the Model Rules, Rule 1.11(a)(2) does not pro-
vide the agency with discretion in granting the firm a waiver since
no consent is necessary, only a procedure verification. Nor does the
rule require that there be a finding of "no appearance of significant
impropriety affecting the interests of the government" as was re-
quired in Formal Opinion 342. Subsection (b) only requires screen-
ing of the potentially disqualified attorney and does not even re-
quire that anyone be notified. Thus, the screening of a disqualified
former government attorney and the potential imputed disqualifi-
cation of his or her law firm have been fertile grounds for a contro-
96. Id.
97. See generally Merrick, Government Service and the Chinese Wall: An Accommoda-
tion Founded on Practicality, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 499 (1981); Note, The Future of the
Chinese Wall Defense to Vicarious Disqualification of a Former Government Attorney's
Law Firm, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151 (1981); Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to
Law Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 677 (1980).
98. See e.g., Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (ABA Formal Opin-
ion 342 was adopted and the Court of Claims opined that the agency could not withhold its
waiver arbitrarily); see also Sierra Vista Hosp. v. United States, 639 F.2d 739 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(supporting the Kesselhaut holding in substance).
99. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.
1979), vacated, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). (The
Second Circuit en banc reversed the earlier Second Circuit panel decision which rejected
ABA Formal Opinion 342. The Supreme Court held that motions to disqualify counsel are
not appealable final decisions.); In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Va. 1981) (The
firm and the former government attorney were disqualified. The court held that an agency
waiver is not binding on a court which has an independent duty to evaluate a disqualifica-
tion.). See generally T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at 198-201; Murphy, Vicari-
ous Disqualification of Government Lawyers, 69 A.B.A. J. 299 (1983).
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versy that will not be remedied by Model Rule 1.11.
One of the relevant prohibitions on "revolving door" attorneys is
not located in Rule 1.11 but is found in Rule 8.4(e). That rule pro-
hibits a lawyer from stating or implying that he or she has "an
ability to influence improperly a government agency or official."
This is an important restriction on former agency attorneys who
represent industry clients before their former agency.
It is the purpose of this article to identify certain potential con-
cerns which the Model Rules present for the attorney passing
through the "revolving door" between regulated industries and
their regulatory agencies. The concerns expressed herein are not
intended to be all inclusive but to focus attention on the weak-
nesses of Model Rule 1.11 as it relates to the ethical considerations
and restrictions on "revolving door" attorneys. Until the state bars
and state supreme courts decide whether to adopt all or a portion
of the Model Rules in their states, the effect of Model Rule 1.11 is
only conjecture. It is submitted, however, that the rule deserves
further consideration. The quality of ethical self-regulation by the
profession is under scrutiny.100 It behooves the legal profession to
regulate itself with the public interest as its priority.
The Supreme Court of Virginia adopted a new Virginia Code of
Professional Responsibility, effective October 1, 1983,101 which
maintained the format of the CPR and did not include Model Rule
1.11. Time will tell whether the other states do the same.
V. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
The regulatory agencies themselves have regulations prescribing
specific standards of conduct for current employees and high-rank-
ing officials and requiring the filing of certain financial statements
reflecting financial interests and employment.102 These regulations
are enforced by the agency's designated ethics official. 103 These
standards of conduct were established under various authorities,
including President Johnson's Executive Order 11,222 of 1965.104
100. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 215, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, 10-12 (Sept. 1, 1983) (Federal
Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1983); see also Bierig, Whatever Happened to Pro-
fessional Self-Regulation?, 69 A.B.A. J. 616 (1983); FTC Attempts to Gain Authority Over
Bars, 32 VA. B. NEws No. 5, at 1, col. 1 (1983).
101. VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:2 (Oct. 1, 1983).
102. 5 C.F.R. § 735.101 (1983).
103. Id. § 738.201.
104. Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 382 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 201 note at 274
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The standards vary by agency and generally relate to the conduct
of the employee "in" government. Certain minimum standards are
set by the Office of Personnel Management. 10 5
At a minimum, a special government employee'06 is prohibited
from utilizing his government position in such a manner as to ap-
pear motivated by the desire for personal gain or the desire to ben-
efit one with whom he has financial, business, or family ties.10 7 Nor
can he utilize non-public, inside information obtained in his gov-
ernment position for the benefit of himself or one with whom he
has financial, business, or family ties. 0 8 Since the regulations vary
by agency and are enforced by the agency's designated ethics offi-
cial, there is a variation in form, substance, and enforcement
among the agencies.
For example, the Federal Trade Commission provides its current
employees with extensive standards of conduct'00 as well as regula-
tions concerning post-employment disciplinary actions involving
conflicts of interest. 10 In these standards, employees are admon-
ished to avoid any actions which might result in even the appear-
ance of preferential treatment, loss of independence, or partial-
ity."' An employee should bring potential enumerated statutory
violations 1 2 to the attention of the agency's chairman," 3 although
the language is not mandatory. The responsibility for identifying
and reporting potential personal violation of the standards rests
primarily on the employee.1 4 In specified instances,r unless au-
thorization is obtained,"" former agency employees are prohibited
for three years from professionally consulting or assisting private
individuals. A detailed "screening" procedure is provided for busi-
ness and law partners of disqualified former employees." 7 Even
(1982).
105. 5 C.F.R. § 735.202-.210 (1983).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 202 (1982); 5 C.F.R. § 735.102(e) (1983) (executive branch employees who
are not members of the Armed Services).
107. 5 C.F.R. § 735.302 (1983).
108. Id. § 735.303.
109. 16 C.F.R. § 5.1-.43 (1983).
110. Id. § 5.51-.68.
111. Id. § 5.10(b), (d).
112. Id. § 5.19(a).
113. Id. § 5.19(b).
114. Id. § 5.6(a).
115. Id. § 4.1(b)(1) (higher standard than 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982)).
116. 16 C.F.R. § 4.1(b)(3)-(4) (1983) (stricter than MODEL RULES, see supra note 79, Rule
1.11).
117. 16 C.F.R. § 4.1(b)(8) (1983) (stricter than MODEL RULES, see supra note 79, Rule
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certain ex parte conversations with agency officials are
prohibited. 118
The Federal Trade Commission's standards of employee conduct
substantially exceed, supplement, and cure some of the statutory
weaknesses. However, such regulations vary significantly by
agency. Some agencies do not specifically require that an employee
report statutory violations119 and generally agency regulations do
not exceed the statutory or Office of Government Ethics
mandatory requirements.
VI. ADDITIONAL STATUTORY AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON
"REVOLVING DOOR" PARTICIPANTS
This article does not purport to enumerate every statutory re-
quirement, prohibition, or regulation which relates to the in-
terchange of personnel between the government and the private
sector; however, some of the significant statutory and other restric-
tions which restrain activities of revolving door participants
include:
1. A government employee cannot personally and substan-
tially participate in certain prohibited activities in which he
knows he, his family, certain of his affiliates or a "person or
organization with whom he is negotiating or has any arrange-
ment concerning prospective employment," has a financial in-
terest.120 The criminal sanctions for a violation of this statute
include up to a $10,000 fine, two years imprisonment, or
both. 121 Congress intended to disqualify government employ-
ees from involvement in matters in which they have a
financial interest or in which they are negotiating for future
employment.1 22
2. A public official or former official cannot directly or in-
directly seek or accept anything of value (which could include
employment), nor can such be offered or given by another for
1.11).
118. 16 C.F.R. § 4.7 (1983).
119. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-10 (1983) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 47 C.F.R.
§ 19.735-210 (1983) (Federal Communications Commission).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1982).
121. Id.
122. S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3852, 3862.
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or because of an official act'2 3 or with an intent to influence an
official act."" The criminal sanctions for these forms of brib-
ery vary and include a fine of up to $20,000 or three times the
value offered or given, whichever is greater, or up to fifteen
years imprisonment, or both. 25
3. An individual cannot compensate another or an entity
in exchange for influence in order to obtain appointive of-
fice.128 Nor may one solicitor receive anything of value for
such influence.127 Further, an individual cannot receive a fee
for referring another to a government agency or department
for employment purposes. 2 ' Sanctions for these violations
could include up to a $1,000 fine, one year imprisonment, or
both.12 9
4. Government employees are prohibited from disclosing
certain confidential or inside government information ob-
tained during the course of their employment or official du-
ties. 30 The protected information generally includes trade or
process secrets or inside, corporate, financial, and commercial
information.13 1 Criminal sanctions of up to $1,000, one year
imprisonment, or both and the removal of the government
employee from employment are the potential penalties for
disclosure of the protected information. 2  This prohibition
has been held'33 not related to information which is reachable
under the Freedom of Information Act,134 which does not
cover confidential trade secrets and commercial and financial
information. 3 5 As a general proposition, the non-disclosure
laws, such as the Privacy Act, 38 and the Freedom of Informa-
123. 18 U.S.C. § 201(f)-(g) (1982).
124. Id. § 201(b)-(c).
125. Id. § 201.
126. Id. § 210.
127. Id. § 211.
128. Id.
129. Id. §§ 210-211.
130. Id. § 1905.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1972) (involving the disclosure of
confidential agency information).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
135. Id. § 552(b)(4). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1976).
136. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982).
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tion Act 37 relate to current government activities and em-
ployees rather than former ones. 13s
Most of the statutory prohibitions restrain current government
employees rather than former or prospective ones and violations
are difficult to detect or to enforce.
VII. CONCLUSION
Absent the empirical data needed to conclusively address the
elusive issue of whether or not agencies are "captured" by the ex-
change of personnel through the "revolving door," a review of ex-
isting restrictions has provided a framework for analysis. The
cross-fertilization derived from the free flow of personnel between
the regulatory agencies and their regulated industries is not unduly
hampered by restrictions. As a general rule, individuals may take
positions with the employer of their choice carrying with them the
knowledge, experience, and contacts derived from their prior gov-
ernment or private employment. Generally, the prohibitions on
most former government employees relate to very specific matters
involving specific parties and restrict only representational com-
munications or appearances before the governmental body relating
to those matters. If prohibitions were extended to side-switching or
"aiding and assisting" in those limited situations, the potential for
abuse of inside government information would be reduced. On the
other hand, enforcement difficulties, the restraint on the employ-
ment freedom of former government employees, as well as the po-
137. Id. § 552.
138. See generally Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Former Government Employees, 90
YAL.E L.J. 189 (1980). The Note contends that former government employees are under a
fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of government information. If that duty is
breached to the benefit of third parties, the third parties should be held accountable for
their profits and appropriate damages. According to the author the utilization of this ap-
proach would provide equal access to, and treatment by, the government.
The issue of abuse of classified government information by current and former govern-
ment employees is being debated at this time. The Administration has supported greater
use of polygraph examinations and prepublication review agreements in order to preserve
classified government information. Under the Administration's proposed policy, individuals
with access to classified information would be required to sign an agreement for life to sub-
mit all writings and speeches which relate to intelligence matters to the government for
review prior to publication. H.R. REP. No. 578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1- 2, 13-21 (1983) (Com-
mittee on Government Operations). See also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1979) (A
former Central Intelligence Agency employee, who had signed a prepublication review agree-
ment, published a book without review. The proceeds therefrom were impressed by a con-
structive trust for the government's benefit.).
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tential negative effects of an additional prohibition on government
recruitment need to be weighed against the public benefit which
would be derived.
With the free flow of individuals and information between the
industry and its regulating agency, there is potential for abuse. Ab-
sent classified information involving national security interests, 139
there are few restrictions upon the information that a former gov-
ernment employee may share with his or her new employer. In
fact, keeping information confidential while in government hands
is even difficult."1 0 Vast amounts of government information are
available to the public through various means, including Freedom
of Information Act requests and the employment of former govern-
ment employees. This free flow of information contributes to open
government and to the freedom of speech which is cherished in
this nation.' The free speech of our public employees is an essen-
tial part of that openness. 42
The potential for undue influence being exerted on regulatory
agencies by their former employees still exists due to the narrow
restrictions placed upon most former government employees. For-
mer high-ranking government officials face additional restrictions
in that area. Nevertheless, most agency contacts by former employ-
ees are not restricted. The extent to which they can and do influ-
ence their former colleagues as a result of those contacts is proba-
bly impossible to determine.
The effectiveness of the existing prohibitions and restrictions as
a deterrent, the education of current government employees as to
their present and future obligations, and the enforcement of those
obligations are primarily the responsibility of designated agency
ethics officials. But the effectiveness of these internal ethics pro-
grams needs study and is difficult at present to determine. 4 Legis-
lation and regulations specifically requiring that current govern-
ment employees identify and report all potential violations of
139. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1982); 50 U.S.C. § 783 (1982) (penalty section).
140. E.g., Comment, Reverse-Freedom of Information Act Suits: Confidential Informa-
tion in Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 995 (1976).
141. Even the Administration's efforts to increase use of polygraph examinations and pre-
publication review agreements in order to control leaks of classified government information
was recently criticized by the House of Representative's Committee on Operations. H.R.
REP. No. 578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
142. Coven, First Amendment Rights of Policymaking Public Employees, 12 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 559 (1977).
143. See New Study, supra note 8.
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statutory or regulatory prohibitions, including those in Section
207, to the designated ethics officials in their agencies could assist
in the enforcement of existing restrictions. However, employees
need to be educated about the ethics programs and how to identify
violations in order for the system to work.
Since presidential appointees occupy the upper echelons of agen-
cies and are thus in a position to formulate significant federal pol-
icy, the Administration has substantial power in this area. Presi-
dential appointees of regulatory agencies generally are appointed
for a specific term and then rotate out into the private sector. If
they leave and return to the same regulated industry, there could
be the appearance or potential for the agency "capture" argument
on a case-by-case basis.
Even with the absence of proof that the regulatory agencies have
been "captured" by the "revolving door" phenomenon, it is reason-
able to conclude that they are being influenced. The extent of that
influence and the value judgments made from the results of that
influence are debatable. Future study, debate, or even scandal may
provide more concrete data or evidence of abuses for analysis at a
later date.
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